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Transfer of European Technologies and Their Adaptations: The Case of the 
Bengal Silk Industry in the Late Eighteenth Century 
Karolina Hutková 
Abstract 
This article investigates the adaptations of the Italian silk technologies to the environment in 
Bengal. The case is particularly interesting as the English East India Company invested 
considerable effort into making the technologies operational in the new climatic and socio-
economic context. The article highlights the unequal focus on technical adaptations, although 
it points out that commercial and economic, and social adaptations were not completely 
neglected. It concludes that the key obstacle for the commercial success of the transferred 
technologies was the lack of attention to institutional adaptations. Institutional problems that 
arose were the result of lack of leadership and managerial innovations on the part of the 
Company rather than the technology itself. 
 
Keywords: Adaptations, technology transfer, Bengal silk industry, English East India 
Company, entrepreneurship and managerial innovations 
 
Adaptations are commonly seen key to the successful transfer of technology: technologies 
need to be adapted to the local circumstances. The literature on technology transfers argues 
that adaptations are decisive for making the transferred technology operational and its 
application in the new environment commercially viable.1 Such adaptations range from 
alterations to the machinery and the institutional framework of production and the 
development of infrastructure.  
This article considers the technical, commercial and economic, social, and 
institutional adaptations of the silk technologies transferred from Europe to Bengal in the late 
eighteenth century. The article points to the necessity to implement not only technical but also 
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commercial and economic, social and institutional adaptations of transferred technologies in 
order to secure their economic success.2 It explores a venture of the English East India 
Company (EEIC) into manufacturing raw silk for export markets in Bengal in which transfer 
of technologies and their adaptations played a central role. The article draws attention to the 
lack of institutional adaptations and attributes this to the lack of leadership and managerial 
innovations on the part of the EEIC. This article concludes that the EEIC was successful in 
implementing technical adaptions of the silk technologies transferred to Bengal. The EEIC 
also took positive steps towards implementing economic and commercial adaptations. The 
implementation of such adaptations was however also negatively affected by the lack of 
entrepreneurship on the part of the EEIC.  
Literature focusing on the eighteenth-century transfer of European silk technologies 
to Bengal ascribed problems with the adoption of the technology in the new environment to 
incompatibilities between the socio-economic environment in Bengal and the requirements of 
the transferred technology.3 This article instead looks at the transfer from the point of the 
EEIC and assesses whether the Company did all the steps necessary for successful 
innovations of the processes of silk production. In this way the article differs from the 
literature that studied technology transfers from the point of compatibility or incompatibility 
of factor endowments between a country importing and exporting particular technology.4 My 
research focuses on the potential of companies to mitigate issues affecting technology 
transfers through the implementation of adaptations. Since businesses need to flexibly 
respond to the various challenges accompanying technology transfers entrepreneurship plays 
key role.  
The first part of the article summarizes main approaches to adaptations and 
technology transfers, it shortly describes the successful adaptation of European cotton and silk 
technologies in Japan in order to draw comparisons with the Bengal case. Part two examines 
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technical adaptation, part three commercial, economic and social adaptations in the Bengal 
raw silk production. Part four focuses on the lack of institutional adaptations.  
 
Adaptations, Technology Transfers and Bengal  
Growth in silk weaving in North-western Europe in the eighteenth century increased demand 
for raw silk, especially in Britain where demand could not be met domestically because the 
climate was unsuitable for sericulture.5 Consequently, this strengthened the interest of the 
EEIC to import Bengal raw silk to Britain. However, the quality of the Bengal raw silk was 
low and not suitable for weaving.6 The Bengalese technologies of sericulture (mulberry 
cultivation and silkworms rearing) and silk reeling (process of making silk thread from silk 
cocoons) lagged behind that of China and Italy – the leaders in the eighteenth-century world 
market. Therefore, in order to improve the quality of the raw silk produced in Bengal, the 
Company decided to adopt Piedmontese silk reeling technologies – the most advanced 
technologies of reeling silk in Europe.7 The Piedmontese technologies required centralization 
of production as the Piedmontese reeling machine represented a considerable capital 
investment. Moreover, supervision was necessary to secure production of high-quality silk 
thread.8 
Overall, the implementation of the Piedmontese technologies necessitated a host of 
changes: setting up silk filatures; training the Bengalese workforce in the new method; 
changes in the organization of labour in silk reeling; and changes in procurement. The process 
of technology transfer was accompanied by a series of adaptations as the technologies needed 
to fit the new climatic, social and economic environment. All the changes were implemented 
by the Company with the aim to significantly increase the quality of Bengal raw silk and 
substitute the importation of raw silk from Italy, Turkey and Mediterranean Europe into 
Britain with Bengal raw silk and to widen the Company’s silk trade.9 However, in spite of all 
the efforts by the EEIC, the quality of the Bengal raw silk did not improve as much as 
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expected. This article considers whether the technology transfer failed to result in quality 
improvement because of lack of adaptations to the technology. 
The development of Bengal silk industry was studied by handful of authors who 
largely explain the problems with the adoption of the new silk technologies in Bengal from 
the point of view of clash of the local practices and socio-economic environment in Bengal 
with the requirements of the transferred technology. The work of Gautam Bhadra emphasised 
the role of the EEIC in making of the British Empire in Bengal, it portrays the Company as a 
power determining the development of Bengal silk production. Bhadra stressed resistance on 
the part of the winders, middleman and peasants rearing cocoons and argued that the EEIC 
had the power of coercion and the diffusion of filatures resulted in ‘subjection to strict 
control’ of primary producers.10 Indrajit Ray argued that the initial resistance to the new 
technology and system of organisation subsided by 1790s and the Company managed to 
diffuse European know-how.11 Yet, the process of technological and organisation innovation 
was not continuous. Ray argued that the nineteenth-century decline of the industry was caused 
by the inability of the Bengal silk industry to catch up with the technological innovations of 
the sector at global scale.12 Sabyasachi Bhattacharya emphasised that social and cultural 
constraints initially slowed down the diffusion of the filature system. The author argued that 
the new system weakened the position of peasants vis a vis the middlemen and the 
Company.13 Roberto Davini, in contrast to the other authors, argued that the EEIC was largely 
unable to control the Bengal economy and this factor negatively affected the progress of the 
filature system.14 Most importantly according to Davini the Company lacked power to reform 
the system of sericulture and the low quality of cocoons was the key obstacle to quality 
improvement of Bengal raw silk.15  
Not denying the difficulties that the Company faced i.e. when recruiting reelers to its 
filatures, procuring cocoons from peasants and dealing with intermediary merchants, my 
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research points to a different conclusion. In spite of all the difficulties the Company 
succeeded in exporting ample quantities of raw silk to Britain – on average over 40 percent of 
raw silk imported to Britain during the period 1773-89 came from Bengal. The most 
significant issue that marred the success of the EEIC’s venture was the quality of the filature 
silk which often did not answer the demand in Britain. This article focuses on the issue from 
the point of the Company and the steps it undertook in Bengal. Businesses often face 
adversary conditions when implementing product and process innovations, especially so in 
new markets, similarly as the EEIC did in Bengal. Successful businesses are able to overcome 
these conditions through innovative approaches and adaptations. Focusing on the ability of the 
EEIC to adapt the transferred technologies permits me to assess whether the Company 
managed the venture into silk industry adequately and encountered problems with the quality 
of the filature silk due to a clash between the local socio-economic environment that could not 
be mitigated. This article differs from the previous research also by focusing on a shorter time 
period – 1760s-1810s – that is before the 1830s when the EEIC was forced to sell its silk 
filatures and cease all its trading activities.  
The literature shows that transfers of technologies from areas with widely differing 
factor endowments often fail. A handful of studies have emphasised that ready access to 
necessary inputs and to output markets are essential for any successful technology transfer.16 
These arguments draw on factor price theory. As valuable as these insights are, differing 
factor endowments were not the reason why the transfer of the Piedmontese technologies to 
Bengal failed to have the intended effect on the quality of the raw silk.17 Moreover, as 
Shannon R. Brown observed, most studies pay only little attention to other factors influencing 
the success of technological borrowing such as institutions, values, etc. in the importing 
country.18  
The concept of adaptation came to the fore in debates about technology transfers in 
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the 1970s, when it became clear that mere technical assistance to developing countries was 
not producing the results hoped for. Literature on the international diffusion of technologies 
argues that transferred technologies must often be adapted if they are to meet the needs of the 
recipient country.19 Differences in the size of the market, in the price of inputs, the cost, 
quality and capability of infrastructure, differences in taste and in climate are some of the key 
aspects that make adaptations necessary.20 Edwin Mansfield and his colleagues focused their 
research on transfers of technology especially at a firm level and they pointed to the fact that 
well-managed firms have better prospects to successfully implement technologies in a new 
environment.21 Such firms, they argued, focus on commercial and economic aspects of 
technology transfer rather than solely on technological solutions.22 
The case of the transfer of the Piedmontese technologies to Bengal supports the 
conclusion that a pure focus on technical aspects of transfers undermines the possibility of 
commercial success. Furthermore, this article underlines that institutional adaptations are as 
important as commercial, economic and technical adaptations because institutions are 
necessary for creating an environment conducive to technological adoption. The article points 
to the fact that entrepreneurship and managerial innovations play key role in institutional 
development. 
Technology can be defined as set of techniques and rules governing the production of 
goods and services.23 Rosenberg has argued that technological change is the process of 
adaptations and modifications and that the capacity of an economy to adapt technologies is 
key for its ‘technical vitality’.24 Similarly, Robert Evenson in his study of technological 
transfers in agriculture calls the introduction of new technology ‘adaptive invention’. His 
argument is based on the understanding that factor prices, soil and climate conditions or new 
agricultural inventions induce changes to adopted technologies.25 
 Although adaptations are crucial, they are the final phase of technology transfer and 
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the most difficult to achieve. The most elementary phase of technology transfer is ‘material 
transfer’ – the export of new products or materials to a recipient country. Design transfer 
denotes the transfer of designs and blueprints and marks the phase of adoption of the new 
technology. At the end of this phase recipient countries have the ability to manufacture new 
products. The final phase is ‘capacity transfer’ – that is the building of the capacity to adapt 
new technologies to local circumstances.26   
Rosenberg’s analysis of technological adaptations shows that changes can be radical 
because technologies are often transferred not only from one place to another but also from 
one industry to another.27 However, even when a technology is transferred within one 
industry, changes inevitably are far-reaching.28 In such a context, the difference between 
macro- and micro-inventions is useful in explaining the process of adaptation. We can 
consider the original transfer of technology as a macro-invention. The process of re-tooling 
and updating of the context in which the technology is utilised, can be seen as that of the 
realm of micro-invention. Joel Mokyr argues that ‘during the implementation stages, 
inventions were usually improved, debugged, and modified in ways that qualify the smaller 
changes themselves as inventions’. He further points out that the process of adaptations often 
resulted in ‘productivity gains as a result of learning by doing’. 29 Such micro-inventions are 
therefore decisive to the successful adoption of a technology.30 
The theoretical findings of Mokyr, Rosenberg and Mansfield about the role of 
adaptations have been reiterated in several case studies which show that adaptations were 
necessary especially when technologies spread to new regions, countries and continents. 
Rosenberg illustrated the key role of the institutional, managerial, technical and organizational 
adaptations in several industries after they spread from Britain to the US in the nineteenth 
century.31 Lilliane Hilaire-Pèrez and Catherine Verna reached similar conclusions for early 
modern technology transfers as did Michael Pearson in his studies of adaptations of European 
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technologies to the environmental and social conditions of Australia.32 Warwick Pearson, 
relying on his study of transfer of the watermill technology from Britain to Australia in 
nineteenth century has drawn several conclusions about the extent of necessary adaptations of 
imported technologies. He found that the extent of adaptations depended on differences 
between the economic and environmental contexts. Moreover, technologies and the materials 
necessary for the construction of the ‘hardware’ of the technologies – machinery and 
equipment – were often transformed under the influence of adaptive pressures from the 
existing system of manufacturing. Socio-cultural variables also played an important role in 
creating an environment either facilitating or opposing transfers.33 
Although the majority of studies on technology transfers emphasise the importance 
of economic factors, several of them nonetheless claim that transfers of technologies often 
necessitate adaptation to the social environment. Janet Hunter, for instance, illustrates how the 
required attributes of employees and social perception of gender influenced the gender 
division of labour in postal and telephone communication services in Meiji Japan.34 Another 
factor that should not be overlooked is the local political-economy context as resistance to 
transferred technologies can impair efforts to adapt them. Brown has demonstrated that the 
adoption of the Western technology of soybean crushing to China in the nineteenth century 
failed not because of the incompatibility of the technology with the Chinese factor 
endowments or environmental conditions, but because of the opposition of merchant guilds 
and government officials.35 
Similarly, the evidence for the silk industry shows that in the case of successful 
transfers, a series of micro-inventions which altered the technology to make it suitable to the 
new environment followed.36 Most of the research on technology transfers in the silk industry 
has focused on transfers of silk twisting technologies.37 Comparatively less research is 
concerned with silk reeling technologies.38 From the point of view of adaptations, the most 
9 
 
interesting case was the transfer of reeling technologies to Japan. Comparing this case with 
the transfer of the Piedmonese reeling technologies to Bengal can shed light on some of the 
shortcomings that technological adaptation encountered in the Subcontinent. 
For the purposes of this article it is effective to compare the transfer of the European 
silk reeling technology to Bengal with the transfers of European silk reeling technologies to 
Japan and also with the transfer of European cotton spinning technologies to Japan. Such a 
comparison allows to relate the successes and failures of the EEIC in adapting new 
technologies to the Bengal environment with the experience of successful adaptations in 
Japan. The comparison illustrates the essential role of entrepreneurship and managerial 
innovations in the success of the Japanese cotton spinning and silk reeling sectors. Such 
comparison is effective in spite of the fact that the technological differences between silk 
reeling and cotton spinning and the fact that the transfer of the Piedmontese silk technologies 
to Bengal took place half a century before the transfer of the European cotton technologies to 
Japan. The unifying factor lies in the fact that both the late eighteenth-century Piedmontese 
silk technologies and the late nineteenth-century British technologies reached a technological 
frontier.39 Adaptation of the technologies to the socio-economic environment of Bengal and 
Japan, respectively, relied on the ability of entrepreneurs to flexibly innovate the technology 
and management to make the technology fit the new environment. European technologies of 
cotton spinning and silk reeling were transferred to Japan in the nineteenth century, their 
successful adaptation to the local socio-economic conditions was the key factor that enabled 
Japan to become one of the largest exporters of textile products in late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. Both of these sectors initially experienced technical difficulties. Scholars of 
Japanese industrialization have pointed to the fact that entrepreneurial management was key 
in facilitating technology and knowledge transfers and overcoming difficulties.40 The new 
technologies necessitated innovative managerial decisions about the allocation of business 
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resources. 
Motoshige Itoh and Masayuki Tanimoto showed that Japanese cotton merchant-
entrepreneurs relied on a mix of traditional and innovative approaches in the production and 
distribution of cottons.41 Cotton spinning was the sector of cotton production that in particular 
relied on entrepreneurship. Japanese cotton spinning – section of cotton industry that 
produced yarn for export and for cotton weaving sector – was on the forefront of adopting and 
adapting European technologies. Eugene Choi stressed that the competitiveness of the infant 
industry and international trading of Japanese-made cotton yarn was facilitated by the 
entrepreneurial leadership of the Osaka Spinning Company and the Mitsui Trading Company 
under the direction of Takeo Yamanobe and Senjiro Watanabe, respectively. The co-operation 
between the companies and their leaders decreased the costs of information about the 
technical and commercial trends and therefore reduced the costs of business decisions. It 
provided entrepreneurial vision to Meiji spinners who lacked knowledge of advanced 
technologies as well as the knowledge and practice of international trade.42 
Transfer of European technologies was essential also for the development of 
Japanese silk weaving industry and similarly as in the case of cotton industry adaptations 
were the key to success. The process of technology transfer went far beyond simple 
transplantation of the new techniques. The requirements of the new technologies on skill and 
knowledge made investment into technical education necessary. As pointed out by Tomoko 
Hashino it was not only the government that facilitated this investment, trade associations set 
up in Meiji silk weaving districts were at the forefront of the efforts – establishing regional 
educational institutes.43 The key importance of investment into specific human capital lays in 
the fact that it enhances the capacity to absorb new technologies and knowledge. Moreover, 
the profitability of silk weaving in Japan was shaped by continuous processes of adaptation of 
the technologies in response to changes in prices of labour and capital, labour productivity, 
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requirements on quality of product etc..44 Entrepreneurial capacities were essential for 
successful adaptation. Tomoko Hashino and Keijiro Otsuka, in their study of changes in the 
early twentieth century weaving in the Japanese district of Kyriu, emphasised that the 
successful product, process and organisational innovations relied on managerial capacity to 
carry them out.45 
The best opportunity to draw comparisons between the Bengalese and Japanese 
experience with adaptations is to look at the transfer of European silk reeling technologies to 
Japan. Successful transfers of silk reeling technology were carried out in Japan in the 
nineteenth century and a century later in East Asian countries.46 In both cases, adaptations of 
foreign technology were key to their successful adoption. The first phase of the transfer of 
European technologies of raw silk production to Japan was not dissimilar to that of Bengal. In 
the late nineteenth century the Meiji government decided to implement a European system of 
filature reeling.47 Similarly to the case of Bengal, the process was managed by foreign silk 
specialists and machinery was imported from Europe. The first Japanese filature, the Tomioka 
filature, followed the European system of filature production in its entirety. However, as it 
soon turned out, the filature suffered losses.48 This initial failure was followed by the 
implementation of a series of adaptations to suit the local conditions. The filature switched 
from a ‘quality-first’ (that is a focus on the production of small quantities of very high-quality 
thread) to ‘quantity-first principle’ (with a focus on the production of large quantities of 
medium-quality thread). Production thus concentrated on thicker silk. Alterations of labour 
management (such as the introduction of gang-production system) were implemented and a 
system of quality control was also introduced.49  
The technical principles according to which new filatures were built were altered as 
well. In the decade following the setting up of the Tomioka filature, the new filatures that 
were erected were smaller than their predecessor and did not use steam-power. They also had 
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smaller production capacity, used less advanced machinery and were more labour intensive.50 
These adaptations of the filature system were supported by institutional and social adaptations 
and by the development of sericulture.51 Debin Ma observed how the expansion of the 
production of raw silk was supported by the development of social and physical infrastructure 
– such as legal system, public education, research, modern monetary and banking systems, 
new transportation and communication systems – during the Meiji period.52 The new 
infrastructure helped the transportation of cocoons to filatures and of silk thread for export 
and created the human capital necessary for research and innovations in sericulture. Domestic 
innovations in sericulture played an important role in the expansion of silk production in 
nineteenth-century Japan.53 
Several differences emerge when we compare the Japanese experience with silk 
reeling with the one from Bengal a century earlier. First, in Bengal technical adaptations were 
given comparatively more attention than economic and commercial adaptations. Second, in 
spite of similar preferences for the production of thicker thread, it took the EEIC several years 
before it favoured a ‘quantity-first principle’. Third, since the adaptations in Bengal were 
designed by silk specialists they narrowly focused on technical and commercial problems and 
did not pay enough attention to the institutional framework of silk reeling. And finally in the 
case of Bengal the development of sericulture was not sufficiently promoted. 
Furthermore, when we compare the Japanese experience in both cotton spinning and 
silk reeling with the case of Bengal silk reeling, it becomes clear that entrepreneurial 
leadership was the factor that was lacking in the Bengal venture. The EEIC was unable to 
innovate the system of management in silk manufacturing in ways that would facilitate the 
development of an efficient institutional framework of production. The Company relied for 
adaptations solely on its silk specialists who had no experience with managing business 
ventures. The Court in London – the principal managerial body of the EEIC – had a good 
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access to information on the development of demand for raw silk in Britain, however, the 
coordination between the Court and the Board of Trade – the principal managerial body in 
Bengal – was highly unsatisfactory. The Board of Trade often did not send reliable and up-to-
date information to the Court in London and it did not implement the instructions it received 
from London. The lack of information sharing enhanced the costs of business decisions and 
undermined commercial and economic adaptations.   
.  
Adaptations of the Reeling Technology 
 
The Company focused in its efforts to improve the quality of the Bengal raw silk exclusively 
on the phase of reeling and paid attention also to the adaptations of the transferred technology. 
Claudio Zanier has observed that the Piedmontese innovations to reeling would not be 
successful if they were not built on organisational, professional, and technical 
improvements.54 The EEIC focused above all on technical adaptations. Such technical 
innovations implemented in Bengal were crucial for making the Piedmontese technology 
operational in the new context. The technical adaptations were thorough and efficient in 
addressing the technical issues, however their implementation was not without problems.  
The Company directed its attention to adapting the reeling machinery to the Bengal 
environment. Considering that little attention was paid to adaptations of the institutional 
structure and to adaptations of sericulture, it is important to note that the Company spared no 
effort to solve the technical problems with reeling machinery. Two points need to be made in 
this respect: first, the Company only implemented innovations necessary to make the reeling 
machinery operational in the Bengal climate. The overall productive capacity or any other 
aspect of the technology were not altered. Second, the EEIC depended on the knowledge and 
advice of James Wiss, one of the silk specialists in the Company’s services, for designing the 
adaptions of the machinery.  
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James Wiss planned most of the adaptations of the reeling machinery.55 Wiss’s 
guidance was also essential for the correct assembling of the reeling machines. He set precise 
guidelines about the distances between the different parts of the reeling machine.56 Such 
detailed instructions were indispensable for making the machine operational as well as for 
producing raw silk of appropriate dimensions. For instance, keeping the appropriate distances 
between the staves of the reel was of primary importance as otherwise the resulting skein of 
silk would not answer the requirements of the European market.57 Wiss also advised the Court 
to send more silk specialists to Bengal and on several occasions suggested suitable 
candidates.58 
The climate of Bengal necessitated two types of adaptations: adaptations of the 
machinery and of its maintenance.59 Most pressing were the problems with the wheels used in 
the reeling machines. In Piedmont, cog wheels were made of wood, however the weather in 
Bengal was detrimental to the use of wood. Wiss pointed out the problems arising from the 
use of wooden cog wheels and instigated the change of wooden cog wheels for brass ones.60 
The Court in London observed that: ‘one capital defect attending filature Silk has arisen from 
the bad condition of the Cog Wheels, which by the heat of the Sun and damp of the night 
frequently become cracked and damaged’.61 Thus, it was decided that the wooden wheels 
would be substituted with brass ones and later that the axis of reels be made of hardened steel. 
The Court had the cog wheels and reels made in Britain and sent to Bengal. The number of 
the wheels and other components sent in 1780s was sufficient to equip all the filatures.  
Change to the material of cog wheels required changes in the whole construction of 
the reeling and double crossing machines. Although such changes were small, they still 
caused confusion among the Company’s servants and the reelers. The Court had to repeatedly 
send guidelines on how the brass cog wheels were to be used and how the reeling machine 
was to be altered. To avoid problems, models showing how the wheels were to be put onto 
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frames to construct the reeling machine were sent from London. 62 The models were to be 
copied in Calcutta so that every filature could receive two models.63  
The climate had a negative impact on the lifespan of the equipment used in the 
filatures and it became necessary to implement specific rules for the maintenance of the 
machinery. This applied also to the brass cog wheels and to the new reels partly made of steel. 
The Court was well aware of the importance of maintenance and the orders sent to Bengal 
were very precise in this respect:  
In regard to the quality of this Brass Cog Wheels we are persuaded if they are kept properly 
oiled and cleaned (neither of which we fear has been the case) they would last many years. 
The Steel Axis should be oiled every day or as often as wanted and the Wheels should be 
covered from dust and cleaned as often as experience might shew they require.64 
The Company had to wrestle not only with the effects of the weather on the machinery but 
also with the resistance of its servants and reelers to adaptations. The Court, for instance, had 
to persuade the servants in Bengal about the usefulness of the new materials. In 1782, the 
Court wrote to Board of Trade in Bengal:  
We were convinced of the efficacy of those Implements before we sent them out, and we are 
surprised at the doubts and difficulties that started to impede their effect, for we did not send 
the Brass Cog wheels to perform different variations, from the wooden ones, as both are 
acting perfectly the same after the Piedmontese principle, which is the only one we can 
permit to be made use of, let the Instrument be constructed of wood, Brass or Iron.65  
Although the models sent to Bengal helped to overcome such resistance, adaptations of the 
machinery were not implemented as smoothly as the Court expected.   
All of this shows that the Company spared no effort to make alterations to the 
machinery that would remedy the technical problems and make the machinery more suitable 
to the conditions of Bengal. The Court in London even evaluated the impact of the 
innovations as can be understood from a letter to the Board of Trade in Bengal: ‘we also 
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direct that a few of the Reels that are worn out may be carefully packed and sent home to us 
by some of the returning Ships, noting how long they were in use, in order that by an 
inspection of their defects, it may be discovered whether any and what means may be adopted 
to remedy the same’.66 The Court was very keen to receive feedback. Apart from evaluating 
the used machinery, it also demanded that ‘after sufficient trial”, the Board would send a 
report on the merits of the innovations.67 The feedback that the Court received shaped further 
efforts and practical problems in putting the altered machinery into use:  
The wheels are thicker, the axis much stronger and the bearings are 3 or 4 times as broad 
besides which one of them is made of hardened Brass and the other hard cast Iron and they 
have holes through them to admit clean oil.68 
Moreover, plentiful attention was being paid to making the altered machinery easy to 
maintain:  
These Reels are not to be screwed down horizontally upon the wood frame but must be fixed 
vertically with the wood pegs uppermost which pegs must be taken out to put oil in them and 
then put in their places again to keep out dust and dirt.69 
Thanks to the silk specialists, the Company had very precise knowledge of the practical 
problems with maintenance of the machinery. Overall, the Company was successful in 
adapting the reeling machinery to the Bengal environment.  
 
Commercial, Economic and Social Adaptations in the Bengal Raw Silk 
Production  
 
Commercial and economic adaptations are part of the final phase of technology transfers. 
They are integral to building the capacity to adapt production processes in order to 
manufacture products that answer the specific demand of the markets. 70 For instance, in the 
Japanese case, one of such adaptations was the switch to the production of coarser silk. When 
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studying the transfer of the Piedmontese technologies to Bengal, it is useful to focus on 
commercial and economic adaptations because these were essential not only to make the 
technology useful in Bengal but also to produce raw silk satisfying the demand in London. 
It cannot certainly be said that the transfer failed due to a lack of attention to the adaptation of 
Bengal raw silk to the needs of the British market. The Court had up-to-date knowledge about 
the demand in Britain and the EEIC embraced several commercial adaptations. The first 
adaptation the EEIC adopted was that of quality differentiation. In the 1780s the EEIC started 
to differentiate the thickness of the Bengal reeled silk into sorts A, B, and C.71 The Company 
became aware that the principle of distinguishing quality according to the number of cocoons 
that were used in the production of the thread was inadequate. The Court complained about 
the old system: ‘We deem this a very indefinite Mode of Expression, as the Cocoons of Italy 
may differ from those of India or China so much that a given Number of each may for a 
Thread of a very different Size’.72 The Court was very attentive to the issue of creating 
standards of fineness of silk. In 1796 it started distinguishing sort A into No 1, 2 and 3, with 
No 1 being the finest. It was even specified that ‘the Letter A No 1, 2 and 3 should be drawn 
from the best Cocoons of the Filatures of Cossimbuzar, Radnagore, Gonatea, and 
Commercolly, in preference but not to the exclusion of the other Filature, as those threads 
seem to be cleaner, and more like the Italian Fabricks’.73 All these efforts of the Court to set 
up standards of fineness of thread and the sending of samples of these different sorts to the 
filatures shows the determination of the Court to create standards of thickness which would 
make it easier for buyers in Britain to choose the exact silk they wanted. It shows that no 
efforts were spared in analysing the demand in London, or in transmitting the information to 
Bengal and in setting precise guidelines about the thickness of raw silk to be sent back to 
Britain. 
The second adaptation was the preference given to production of thicker thread. The 
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initial aim of the EEIC was to produce high-quality silk of the fineness of the Italian silk in 
Bengal. The Company was confident that the improvement of the quality of the raw silk 
would enable it to outcompete its rivals: ‘[we] entertain no doubt but that in a short time the 
Quality of our Merchandize Imported [raw silk] will obtain for us a decided preference over 
the Importations of any other Country’.74 At first, the focus on the production of thicker thread 
was driven by the technical difficulties of producing the finest quality thread in the rainy 
season. This task was nearly impossible because cocoons were more prone to get mouldy and 
silk threads never dried properly in the rainy season. Therefore the Court directed that in June, 
July and August silk was ‘to be spun of 7 to 8, 9 to 10, and 10 to 12 Cocoons’ instead of 
producing coarser silk.75 The Company still supported the production of the finest sorts of silk 
but only outside the rainy season and in limited quantity. For instance, in 1785 the Court 
ordered that:  
1/5 of the 360,000 small lbs. of Filature Silk abovementioned be wound of equally in quality 
and size (neither coarser nor finer) than the sample A, 2/5 of the said 360,000 small lbs. 
equal in size but not coarser than the sample B and the remaining equal in size to the letter C, 
if however these assortment should be reeled a little coarser it will not prejudice the sale 
provided the Silk is wound off perpetually even, round and clean.76 
Until the late 1780s and early 1790s the preference given to finer thread meant that the 
production of thicker thread was insufficient to satisfy the demand in Britain. The EEIC 
preferred the production of finer thread notwithstanding the high demand for thicker thread on 
the British market. Only in 1793 the Court deemed that ‘the coarse Sort has been the most 
productive’, from the point of view of sales, and ordered that 1/9 of the quantity demanded to 
be reeled of sort A, 4/9 of sort B, and 4/9 of sort C.77 The Company favoured the thicker sorts 
of silk threads as these more readily found market in Britain.  
It should be assumed that the Court was successful in adapting the filature system to 
the social environment of Bengal, especially in adapting the gender-division of labour to the 
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local norms. Although the gender division of labour was not addressed directly by the 
Company, it is apparent that the changes to the Piedmontese system were far-reaching. In 
1788 women represented approximately 72 percent of the workforce employed in filatures in 
Piedmont.78 Women were employed as master-reelers, as apprentice-reelers and young girls 
were assigned the task of watching over the fire under the basins. The reason for employing 
women as reelers was that they were considered to have more skilful fingers for the task of 
reeling.79 In Bengal reeling outside the household was done by Cuttanies – male reelers 
travelling from village to village.80 The Company seemed well-aware of the gender division of 
labour in silk reeling and relied on male workforce in filatures.81 
The reason why the EEIC was successful in planning adaptations was that it relied on 
silk specialists for diffusion of the reeling technologies. Several studies recognise the role of 
skilled individuals such as craftsmen, technicians, engineers, and mechanics in transferring 
foreign technologies.82 Rosenberg has argued that the role of practitioners is key because not 
all technical knowledge can be codified or learnt from the technical literature.83 However, the 
dependence on silk specialists for transmission of new technologies also had its drawbacks. 
The EEIC relied on the specialists for technical and commercial changes and even for 
adapting the system to the social environment in Bengal. However, it could not expect the silk 
specialists to reform the institutional framework of filature production. The adaptations that 
the specialists suggested had a technical character; the Company did not employ any 
personnel with managerial skills to adapt the institutional framework to the conditions of 
Bengal. In this way the adaptations significantly differed from the economic adaptations of 
the reeling system in Japan a century later when managerial rather than technical rationales 
were invoked in changing the system of production.84 As a consequence, the EEIC faced 
problems with the implementation of these adaptations. For instance, the silk it obtained quite 
often did not answer the system of thickness of A, B and C as the thread sent to London was 
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often finer or coarser than what was demanded.85 
 
Institutional Adaptations in Bengal Silk Production 
Institutional adaptations also belong to the final phase of adaptations and are key for efficient 
organisation of production. Besides the system of organisation of labour, it is frequently also 
necessary to innovate the systems of contracts with suppliers and systems of marketing. In the 
case of Bengal silk production, institutional adaptations were neglected by the EEIC. The 
Company did not innovate the system of management of its servants involved in silk reeling 
in Bengal and it was unable to put in place a system of contracts with peasants rearing 
silkworms that would secure it a supply of high quality cocoons. This had serious effects on 
the quality of reeled silk.  
Gautam Bhadra and Sabyasachi Bhattacharya mentioned resistance of local actors – 
peasants, intermediary merchants, and reelers – to the filature system as the most significant 
obstacle for achieving the demanded quality and quantity of silk. They found that the 
Residents – senior English officer – and superintendents of filatures often complained of 
difficulties with contracting reelers and the fact that reelers did not stay in the Company’s 
employment for long periods of time.86 Pykars – intermediary merchants procuring cocoons 
for the Company – often paid peasants very low prices for their cocoons and sold them to the 
Company for significantly higher prices.87 Peasants thus preferred to reel their cocoons and 
sell raw silk on the local market rather than to sell them to the EEIC.88 In some rearing 
seasons, especially when the harvest was smaller, the Company had problems to procure the 
demanded quantity of cocoons. However, the want of cocoons was never as serious as to halt 
Company’s production altogether. The above grievances were legitimated and had to 
negatively affect the filature production, however the quality of the filature silk suffered 
principally due to the management practices of the Company’s own employees. Moreover, the 
EEIC even suffered losses due to mismanagement. 
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Several papers studied the internal management of early modern trading companies 
such as the EEIC, Royal African Society, Hudson Bay Company and Russian Company and 
the ways in which the Companies dealt with opportunism of its employees.89 This literature 
found private trade to be the major source of opportunism of employees of trading 
Companies. The only exception was the EEIC as Santhi Hejeebu found that access to private 
trade motivated the Company’s employees to fulfil orders from London as private trade was 
their major source of income and they would lose access to it upon dismissal.90 Rachel E. 
Kranton and Annand V. Swamy focused on the EEIC’s management of its contractual 
relations with producers. They found that in the procurement of cotton textiles the Company 
was unable to overcome opportunism on the part of its contractors and employees involved in 
enforcement of contracts with weavers due to geographical distance and poor management. 
Since weaving villages were far from the Company’s factories the EEIC needed to rely on 
intermediaries in textile procurement. The Company was unable to strike balance between the 
power it gave to its employees and intermediaries whose role was to enforce contracts with 
weavers. In the early eighteenth century the weavers were oppressed by intermediaries. In the 
late eighteenth century too much power shifted to weavers with the outcome that they often 
did not fulfil their contracts and took advance from the EEIC but sold their production locally. 
The authors argued that vertical integration would have been too expensive as weavers were 
scattered on large area, moreover, it would bring new agency problems.91 The Company’s silk 
venture proved this conclusion to be right as vertical integration did not curb opportunism. 
Moreover, in the case of filature silk production the EEIC had to deal with opportunism of 
both its employees and the intermediary merchants and peasants from whom it procured 
cocoons.  
The example of the Agency System implemented by the EEIC and later the British 
Crown in opium production shows that innovations in the systems of management could 
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mitigate opportunism. The Opium Agency secured the EEIC a monopoly on cultivation and 
sale of opium. According to Kranton and Swamy the key reason why Opium Agency 
mitigated opportunism was its market power and the fact that the EEIC built an institutional 
framework that enabled it to control its agents. The monitoring system consisted of two 
Opium Agencies, 27 sub-agencies each linked to three to four sub-divisional offices. 
Moreover, the officials in the agencies went through special training.92 
In the case of silk production in Bengal the Court in London focused solely on 
implementing the technical aspects of the Piedmontese technologies and paid little attention to 
the system of quality enforcement and management of its employees. This negatively affected 
both the quality of cocoons and quality of reeling.  
The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Piedmontese superiority in the production 
of raw silk was underpinned not only by technical innovations but also by important 
institutional changes in production. Such changes – Claudio Zanier notes – ‘also reverberated 
back to the agricultural phase in compelling producers to raise cocoon quality’.93 The case of 
nineteenth-century Japan also point to the importance of adapting sericultural practices. The 
development and technological upgrading of sericulture aided the success of Japan in 
becoming a major exporter of raw silk.94 The EEIC, on the other hand, made no serious 
attempt to alter sericulture in Bengal. It must be said that the silk specialists sent to Bengal by 
the Company pointed to the fact that sericulture was no less problematic than the practices of 
silk reeling. Thus, by neglecting to address these issues and by focusing solely on silk reeling, 
the Company undermined its attempts to improve the quality of Bengal raw silk. 
The quality of reeled silk is determined by the quality of cocoons and by the quality 
of reeling. The quality of cocoons depends on the practices of sericulture and on their storing 
and handling. In contrast to silk reeling, the EEIC did not attempt to adapt the practices of 
sericulture. The highest management bodies of the Company – Court of Directors in London 
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and Board of Trade in Bengal – were aware that it would be very expensive to directly 
supervise silk worms rearing and mulberry cultivation because these activities were labour 
intensive and scattered over the expanse of Bengal. The Company had to rely instead on 
intermediaries and face the problems with the quality of the procured cocoons. The Company 
would have to innovate its contractual and management practices if it wanted to further 
increase the quality of the silk thread. Under the contemporary system of contracts the 
Company did not have the means to compel peasants to implement practices that would 
increase the quality of cocoons and deliver cocoons of demanded quality.  
Due to the lack of control over peasants – peasants could sell their cocoons on the 
local markets – the EEIC could impose no practical measures of quality improvement. 
Rearing silkworms under the Company’s direct control would have been very expensive. 
Altering the system of sericulture would be exceedingly difficult.95 Rearing silkworms 
remained a household activity at least until the late nineteenth century in all silk producing 
regions of the world. Coercing whole families to become involved in sericulture under the 
EEIC’s management and control would require more political power than the Company had.96 
Moreover, direct supervision of the rearing activities would be very expensive. Giovanni 
Federico has argued that the principal reasons for sericulture to remain a household activity 
were its labour intensity and the high costs of supervision that centralization of sericultural 
production would elicit.97   
In Japan the problems with the quality of cocoons were solved through innovations 
in the system of contracts rather than through vertical integration. Japanese silk reeling 
factories secured supply of adequate quantity and quality of cocoons by implementing sub-
contractual direct purchase system. The system established long-term exchange between 
reelers and peasants. Under this system reeling factories provided peasants with scientifically 
bred silkworm eggs and technical guidance and gained monitoring capacity. Peasants secured 
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a long-term contract for their output.98  
In the Bengal case, innovating solely the system of contracting for cocoons would 
not achieve the desired effect on quality, unless the Company also managed to control its 
servants better and prompted them to pay attention to the quality of production. The second 
problem the EEIC faced was the decline in the quality of the cocoons due to inappropriate 
handling by the Company’s employees. Only by implementing changes to the institutional 
framework of production the EEIC could incentivise its Bengal employees to pay attention to 
the storing of cocoons which would have significantly improved the final quality of silk 
thread. As one of the European silk specialists employed by the EEIC contended, attaining 
perfect cocoons was central to improving the quality of raw silk since ‘notwithstanding the 
ability of workmen perfect silk cannot be reeled from bad cocoons’.99 Many issues with the 
quality of cocoons could have been avoided if the cocoons were stored in better conditions, 
however, the Company was unable to enforce such practice.  
The lack of improvement of the quality of the cocoons represented an impediment to 
the improvement of the quality of the silk thread. Opportunistic behaviour and lack of 
attention to quality was common in cocoons handling and silk reeling. The key issue was that 
the geographical distance did not allow the Court of Directors to fully benefit from 
hierarchical organization of filature reeling. Whereas in Piedmont the merchant-entrepreneurs 
strengthened their control over the process of reeling, the Court had to delegate its control to 
the Board of Trade in Bengal which had to delegate the control further due the distance 
among the filatures (figure 1). The outcome was lack of control over the reelers and the 
Company’s employees involved in silk production. None of the actors involved in silk 
production – Board of Trade, directors of filatures and reelers – were rewarded for producing 
high-quality silk and it was exceedingly difficult to punish them as it was almost impossible 
to ascertain direct responsibility for faults in quality and because the Company’s employees 
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working in silk production changed frequently.100 Thus, it should not be surprising that 
cocoons were often handled and stored in inappropriate way which led to their fermentation.  
Figure 1. System of hierarchy in filature silk production in Bengal, 1770s-1810s 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Court showed concern over the way cocoons were being stored. Inappropriate 
modes of storing cocoons were known to have a negative impact on the quantity of silk reeled 
from cocoons, on the colour of the silk, and consequently on the Company’s profits:    
Supposing a quantity of Cocoons, this taken care of produce lb 1000 of good Silk; the same 
quantity, and of the same kind, not carefully placed, not frequently turned, will probably not 
produce 950 lb., perhaps not near so much, of inferior Silk, indifferent in quality, and 
defective in colour; for Cocoons neglected will grow mouldy, and from this will originate all 
the evils above specified respecting Silk spun from damaged Cocoons. It will not be in the 
power of the Spinners to prevent Silk made from such Cocoons from being discoloured; the 
Contractors will get nothing by it; and the Company will loose the profit, which they would 
otherwise gain, upon Silk made from good Cocoons.101 
In order to prevent these problems the Court ordered that all ‘bad’ cocoons were to be 
separated from the good ones upon arrival at the filatures. The Court sent to Bengal a very 
detailed explanation of the necessity to rigorously implement such a step: ‘every Cocoon that 
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is bruised, or in which the Worm has been squashed, will spot as many good Cocoons as 
come in contact with it; and all such Cocoons will grow mouldy, foul the water in the Pan 
exceedingly; and infallibly cause the Silk to be of bad Colour’.102 Unfortunately, these rules 
were often not complied with which had negative consequences for the quality of silk thread. 
British silk manufacturers frequently complained about the colour of the silk and the 
difficulties to dye such silk.103 Moreover, reeling mouldy cocoons had a negative effect also 
on the strength of the silk thread as mouldy cocoons had their gummy substance – which 
makes silk thread strong and flexible – weakened. Also the use of unclean water in reeling 
weakened the flexibility of the thread. Consequently, Bengal silk threads frequently broke, 
especially during throwing into silk yarn in British mills.104  
In filature reeling inadequate system of monitoring of employees led to opportunism 
and lack of commitment to the goal of producing high-quality silk. First, many of the 
superintendents of the filatures lacked sufficient knowledge of silk production and/or paid 
little attention to quality control. One of the consequences was that good quality silk was 
mixed with deficient quality silk in one bale. This had negative effect on the prices of the raw 
silk, especially as good silk was placed on the top of the bale and inferior was inside it, since 
buyers had no way to ascertain the quality of the silk within the bale, the demand dwindled. 
This was, for instance, the case of a filature directed by Mr Burges that sent to Britain good 
quality silk reeled over coarse silk. The Company believed that this was due to Burges being 
deceived by reelers as he lacked sufficient knowledge of reeling, yet in spite of this finding 
the EEIC made to no attempt to formally educate its employees in the principles of silk 
manufacturing.105 The Court ordered that its employees involved in silk trade should ‘improve 
themselves in the knowledge’ and sent guidelines on the ‘best practices’ of silk production but 
took no further step.106  
Second, due to the geographical distance the Court in London was dependent on the 
27 
 
Board of Trade in Bengal and the Residents for information considering both quality and 
purchasing prices of cocoons and raw silk. Not having a mechanism to check this information 
made the Company vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour. Asymmetry of information 
between the Board of Trade in Bengal and the Court in London became a major source of 
opportunistic behaviour in the production and procurement of filature silk, especially at times 
when the EEIC was procuring silk from private filatures with the aim to increase exports to 
Britain. For example, during the period 1774-86 the Board of Trade was buying silk from 
private filatures for prices significantly higher than costs of production and its members were 
making profit at the expense of the EEIC (table 1).  
Table 1. Contract prices of silk from private filatures, 1774-1784 (in Sicca Rupees/Seer) 
Year Country-wound silk 
(in Rupees) 
Filature silk Costs of production of 
filature silk in EEIC's 
filatures 
1774 9 to 10 14  
1775 8.5 to 10.9 12.5 to 13.5  
1776 8.5 to 10.9 -  
1777 8.5 to 10.5 10.5 to 13.5  
1778 8 to 10.5 11.4 to 12 or 13 6 Rupees 3 Annas 5 Pice 
1779 8 11.6 to 12 (or 6.2 Rupees or 13s. 5d.) 
1780 8.4 to 11.1 11.6 to 12  
1781 8.8 to 11.1 11.6 to 12  
1782 7.8 8.8  
1783 7.8 8.8  
1784 7.8 8.8  
 
Sources: IOR/E/4/630, 12 April 1786, p. 389; TNA C 12/175/27, 24 March 1789 to 11 November 1789. The 
costs of production of filature silk in the Company’s filatures, stated in the third column, were not cited for any 
specific year and should be considered as an average for the period. 
All figures in the first two columns are in Rupees. Under the eighteenth-century monetary system in Bengal 16 
Annas were equivalent to 1 Rupee and 12 Pice were equivalent to 1 Anna. 
  
It took the Court in London several years to uncover this practice. The reasons why 
the Company was unable to detect this fraud sooner was the time-lag in communication and 
the lack of access to precise information.107 In 1783 the Court demanded information about 
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the breakdown of the costs of filature silk production but did not receive such information 
from the Board.108 A year later, in 1784 the Court turned to James Frushard – at the time the 
owner of a private silk filature in Bengal – for information about the breakdown of the costs 
of production.109 The information the Court received confirmed that the price the Company 
was paying for filature silk was exorbitant. As table 1 shows, the prices for which the 
Company bought raw silk from private filatures (the EEIC bought both country-wound and 
filature silk) was considerably higher than the cost of reeling silk in the Company’s filatures. 
A significant difference between the Japanese and Bengal case of transfer of reeling 
technologies was the lack of changes in Bengalese sericulture and lack of institutional 
adaptations. When adapting the Piedmontese system of reeling to the Bengal environment, the 
EEIC paid special attention to the technical adaptations of the reeling technology and to 
commercial adaptations. In contrast, the EEIC’s attempts to adapt sericulture never got 
beyond the stage of experimentation. The EEIC did not develop a system of contracting for 
cocoons that would secure it a sufficient supply of good quality cocoons as the Japanese 
filatures managed. Most importantly, the Company did not develop a system to monitor its 
employees and enforce contracts. This negatively affected the venture into silk manufacturing, 
especially as quality control is essential for producing uniform quality raw silk. 
 
Conclusion 
The case presented here shows that technical, commercial and economic, social, and 
institutional adaptations all play an important role for economic success of technology 
transfers. The technical adaptations play key role because without them the new technology 
cannot be used in the new environment. Social adaptations are necessary, especially for 
attracting workforce as foreign technologies often do not adhere to social norms. Economic 
and commercial adaptations guarantee the production of goods answering the specific demand 
of markets. Finally, institutional adaptations are indispensable to make organisation of 
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production efficient. The Bengal case shows that the institutional adaptations might be the 
most difficult to adopt, especially if adaptations are designed by specialists who rely solely on 
technical knowledge.   
Overall the adaptations of the Piedmontese technology were far from minimal, 
especially in the case of the technical adaptations necessary to make the technology reliable in 
Bengal. The EEIC was not oblivious to the need to adapt the Piedmontese reeling 
technologies to the Bengal context. However, the innovations the Company implemented 
addressed only the most pressing issues. First, in order to make the Piedmontese technology 
suitable to the climatic conditions of Bengal, technical alterations were put in place. For this 
reason brass wheels were substituted for wooden ones and reels started to be made partly of 
iron. Second, besides technical innovations the Court focused on commercial adaptations such 
as the regulation of the thickness of the thread and setting-up of a new standard of thickness. 
Third, the Company attempted to innovate the way in which cocoons were stored. Last, the 
EEIC was swift in adapting to the gender-division of labour in silk reeling in Bengal. 
The alterations to the Piedmontese technology cannot be considered as thorough as 
the ones implemented in the Japanese silk reeling and cotton spinning industry in the 
following century. The fact that the Company did not alter the system of organization of 
production or did not innovate the system of quality control derived from the technical input 
of the silk specialists. The engagement of silk specialists had its obvious advantages as they 
built on their very detailed knowledge of silk reeling and were thus able to propose suitable 
alterations. On the other hand, the knowledge of these specialists did not stretch beyond the 
technical aspects of silk reeling. This is the key difference between the transfers of European 
technologies to Bengal and to Japan. In Japan thanks to entrepreneurial capacities adaptations 
were more far-reaching. Business strategies of such companies as Osaka Spinning Company 
and the Mitsui Trading Company in cotton spinning provided entrepreneurial vision for the 
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whole sector and decreased the costs of business decision through better access to information 
about technologies and far-away markets. The EEIC was unable to attain a position of 
entrepreneurial leadership due to the inefficient system of sharing information between 
London and Bengal and vice versa and inefficient system of managing its employees in 
Bengal. 
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